











Swift, Adam (2017) Review of Education and Equality edited by Allen, D. Ethics, 127 (3). pp. 
762-767. 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/89489                            
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
© 2016 by Chicago Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/690074  
 
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented in WRAP is the published version or, version of record, and may be 
cited as it appears here. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk  
 
BOOK REVIEWS
Allen, Danielle. Education and Equality. With comments by Tommie Shelby, Mar-
celo Suárez-Orozco, Michael Rebell, and Quiara Alegría Hudes.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016. Pp. 150. $30.00 (cloth).
Danielle Allen’s 2014 Tanner Lectures, published here with comments and reply,
offer an ambitious and rich blend of themes. Baldly summarized, they offer a de-
fense of the place of humanities and social sciences in the curriculum, a variant
on familiar objections to governments’ current preoccupation with the “vocational”
and promotion of science, technology, engineering, andmathematics (STEM). But
her framing the argument in terms of connections between education and equality
is excitingly distinctive, and her route to her conclusion engages with an unusual
range of influences andmodes of theorizing. In just fifty pages, the argument flu-
ently shifts from conceptual analysis to excavation of the logic of practice (à la
Bourdieu) to recommendations for improving the mechanisms by which schools
can be held accountable. It combines Rawls and Arendt while criticizing Piketty
and Plato. It elaborates the educational goal of “participatory readiness,” one el-
ement of which is developed into an account of civic agency adequate to contem-
porary politics, while appealing to recent empirical evidence on the impact of so-
cial science classes on students’ political participation. Overall it shows the value
of sustained engagement with a range of academic disciplines and approaches,
both theoretical and empirical. While the sheer variety and profusion of material
sometimes left me working hard to keep a grip (and I will offer my attempt to
tame and frame at the end), Allen’s big ideas come through loud and clear.
When thinking about the relation between education and equality, many of
us are not interested in what “the actual good called education fundamentally
is” (3). Theorists of social justice, for example, care about ‘education’ mainly be-
cause it is an important causal factor influencing people’s access to other goods;
if jobs and the rewards that attach to them were distributed in ways that bore no
relation to how much—or what kind of—“education” individuals received, its
distribution would lose much of its normative significance. Similarly, politicians
whose policies are driven by a desire to equip children born into poverty with the
labor market skills they need to escape it, or by the perceived importance of a
country’s having an “educated” workforce so that it can compete successfully
in the global economy, are treating education simply as a means. So are econo-
mists who recommend the diffusion of knowledge as the best way to bid down
inequalities in income and wealth.
Thinking about education itself, however, offers new and different ways to
understand its egalitarian potential. Although states’ involvement in the busi-
ness of institutionalizing education may be justified on utilitarian grounds—
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economic or military competitiveness, the maintenance of democratic life—the
microjustification of particular instances of educating must be eudaemonistic.
“In order to count as education, the practices sponsored by those institutions
need to further the development of an individual qua human being—namely a
creature whose flourishing entails the development of a range of valuable cogni-
tive, affective and intersubjective capacities” (14). Understood in terms of this
“humanistic baseline” and with a democratic, Arendtian account of flourishing
that, contra Plato, sees all human beings as possessing potentialities for a wide range
of needs and potentialities—for breadwinning work, civic and political engage-
ment, creative self-expression, and rewarding intimate relationships—education
is intrinsically connected to equality, not just instrumentally so.
Which connection between education (properly understood) and equality
takes various forms. In contrast to more aristocratic perspectives, the vision is
one in which all students are treated as capable of the full range of potentialities;
the distinctively democratic form of eudaemonism “orients us toward a peda-
gogic practice that is in itself egalitarian in that it seeks to meet the same range of
needs for all students” (17). And because the humanistic baseline requires that
we think about the education of all students in the context of a broad notion of
flourishing, it “reinforces an egalitarian orientation toward human dignity that
can disappear if we focus exclusively on the state-level justifications of education,
which instrumentalize the student” (26). Finally, educating all citizens so that
they are prepared for civic and political engagement not only brings into play
a concept of political equality but also offers the prospect of political contesta-
tion over economic inequality. Political choices determine the policies that shape
distributive patterns: “This is where education’s true egalitarian potential comes
into play. It supplies the basis for forms of participatory democracy that might
contest the labor market rules that deliver insupportable forms of income in-
equality” (31).
As the last quotation suggests, Allen is most interested in this third education-
equality connection: it is this that is explored most fully, and this that provides
the argumentative link to a liberal arts curriculum. Civic agency requires much
more than “informed citizens”—citizens who know their rights and understand
the mechanics of government. It involves understanding how cultural norms can
be changed, how to interact with corporations and nongovernmental organiza-
tions, how to be effective on the Internet. It demands “democratic knowledge,”
the science and art of association, the capacity to bond with some and to build
bridges to others. It requires that citizens can interpret and understand their po-
litical circumstances, that they have the capacity to deliberate, diagnose, and per-
suade; these are fundamentally linguistic or verbal skills, which together consti-
tute “verbal empowerment.”
This is where the humanities and social sciences come in: “As we cultivate
verbal empowerment in our students, we build the foundation for a politically
competitive social and political system” (49). This is the alternative way for edu-
cation to challenge economic inequality: a holistic education, with a strong hu-
manistic focus, delivered to all students, could produce a radical rewriting of the
distributive rules in a way that STEM subjects and a merely vocational approach
cannot. For Allen, the road to more distributive equality runs via the liberal arts
curriculum.
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This short book helped me see several new things and several old things
afresh. Allen is right that academics working on education tend to divide into
those who come at it from an interest in broader distributive issues and don’t
seem that interested in what education actually is and those who are interested
in education but don’t seem that bothered by its connection to wider questions
of social justice. In forcing that divide into the open, and offering various stim-
ulating thoughts about how to bridge it, Allen breaks intriguing new ground.
Her suggestion, in effect, is that those in the first camp are operating with too
limited a picture of the feasible set, missing education’s distinctively egalitarian
potential. They see that the distribution of education influences the distribution
of other goods, and may affect its own positional value, but neglect the way in
which a curriculum aimed specifically at enhancing political equality may play
a more game-changing role, challenging the norms and rules around what kinds
of economic inequality are acceptable.
Her discussion of civic agency was, for me, themost exciting part of the book.
It brought home the extent to which my academic training and intellectual mi-
lieu has wedded me to, and embeddedme in, the “impartial deliberation” aspect
of preparation for citizenship; in terms of my own microjustifications, she has al-
ready made me think differently about what I am doing when I teach. An inter-
esting issue here concerns to what extent a division of labor approach is appro-
priate. Perhaps some of us can go on teaching our students to make distinctions
and evaluate arguments while leaving it to colleagues to cultivate their rhetorical
capacities and equip them with the other skills they need to engage effectively in
political life. (I confess that I find it hard not to grimace when undergraduates
tell me how keen they are on debating. Frommy perspective, that kind of rhetor-
ical skill is something to be knocked out of them.)
Allen’s contribution will undoubtedly provoke extended discussion and care-
ful evaluation of the many discrete argumentative moments. Indeed, in addition
to the comments collected in this volume, there has already been a symposium in
the Boston Review that assembles a number of commentators who discuss a help-
fully accessible version of part of the argument. Certainly, as others have noted,
her case depends on some somewhat speculative causal claims that are supported
by rather limited empirical evidence. But there are also places where the reason-
ing eluded me.
Most important, perhaps, she makes much of the idea that current debate
about the proper purpose of education—often captured as “vocational” versus
“liberal”—should be understood as invoking “two concepts of education” (which
is the title of her first chapter). Drawing on Rawls’s early analysis of punishment,
Allen suggests that the “logic of education makes two different kinds of justifica-
tion relevant to the practice: there is the justification for the state’s maintenance
of a system of education, and the justification for particular instances of teaching
carried out within the system” (11). This is the divide that underlies the apparent
conflict between “utilitarian” and “eudaemonistic” views about education’s proper
purpose—with only the latter offering the appropriate justification for the “actual
goal of educating” (13).
The last move in that chain is a bit of conceptual analysis: if it isn’t develop-
ing individual human beings by developing their capacities for flourishing, then
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it isn’t “education.” Nothing much turns on that, and certainly the etymology of
the wordmeshes with her take on it, but there is something to be said for an anal-
ysis that makes “education” more descriptively concerned simply with the pro-
cesses that produce the knowledge, skills, dispositions, and attitudes that inhere
in people. On that alternative conceptualization, children might be “educated”
in ways that not only fail but do not even try to develop their potentialities, and it
is a separate question what particular goods education should indeed seek to
promote, both in the lives of those being educated and in those of third parties
who stand to benefit or suffer from the way others are educated (Harry Brig-
house et al., “Educational Goods and Values: A Framework for Decision-Makers,”
Theory and Research in Education 14 [2016]: 3–25).
But it is the “two concepts, two logics” aspect of the argument that I find
most mysterious. As Tommie Shelby notes in his particularly instructive comment,
there seems to be an underargued shift from “the logic of the socio-political
practice of state involvement in education,” or indeed “the logic of education
properly understood,” to a claim about what forms of education or modes of ed-
ucating are in fact justified. I can understand how the logic of a practice might
include or generate claims about what actions it justifies, but it seems a further
question whether that practice is indeed itself justified or can indeed justify the
actions that constitute it.
Allen’s picture, as I understand it, is complicated—and I wonder whether it
is more complicated than is helpful. She wants to insist that the state’s utilitarian
purposes do in fact justify its involvement in and maintenance of a system of ed-
ucation, even though those purposes are not themselves “educational” sensu
stricto. It is the micropractice, with its eudaemonistic justifications of particular
instances of educating, which aims at the latter. But she also seeks a “coherent”
account of the purposes of education that integrates or aligns the two (14) and
notices that two of the four human needs identified by her Arendtian, democratic
account of flourishing (breadwinning and civic engagement) are in fact those at
which the sociopolitical practice was aiming in any case: “the state’s ‘utilitarian’
goods (economic competitiveness and a flourishing citizenry) turn out to be fea-
tures of an individual’s eudaemonistic good if merely considered from a different
perspective” (17). She has previously noted, along similar lines, that “even if one
thinks it necessary to teach a child his tribe’s rituals in order to preserve that tribe
(a collective utilitarian concern), one in all probability also thinks that life in that
tribe is in the child’s best interests (a eudaemonistic perspective), so one’s view
about inculcating social norms is tethered to a view about the child’s good” (13).
Allen seems to see this overlap between the utilitarian goals of the state and
the eudaemonistic purposes of educators, properly understood, as a happy coin-
cidence. She talks about a “surprising proximity” (18) between the system-level
goals and the individual-level goals that emerge from her eudaemonistic account.
That would make sense if she were conceiving the former in merely descriptive
terms. There is, after all, no reason why the state should have been interested in
the well-being of its citizens (and surely plenty of states have not been). But if the
state’s involvement in education really is justified by its “utilitarian” goals, then
that surprise seems odd. One might rather think: “Of course the two coincide!
Just as well! If the state’s purposes in education were not aligned with the inter-
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ests of its citizens, how would its establishment and maintenance of the sociopo-
litical practice of educating them be justified?”
From this perspective, what seems strange is rather that two of her four ele-
ments of human flourishing—creative self-expression and rewarding relation-
ships—do not align with the system-level justifications for education. Allen rejoices
at that fact, on the grounds that we do not want the state to colonize our lives in
those areas, though she also insists that the state must “leave space” for them (18).
This left me unclear whether, for her, the state is justified in ensuring that its ed-
ucational institutions do indeed develop those potentialities (albeit without spec-
ifying particular content of a kind that might perhaps count as “colonization”) or
whether she really thinks it is not the state’s business to concern itself at all with
those capacities (its role being merely to give educational institutions the space
to do that if so inclined). The former is surely the more plausible position, and
what she says about how teachers should be held accountable across all four di-
mensions suggests that she agrees. But in that case the state’s involvement in ed-
ucation is not limited to that justified by its “utilitarian” purposes, and the grand
schema that distinguishes those from education’s intrinsic eudaemonistic goals
seems to lose its bite.
Many of Allen’s substantive claims are extremely important: the need for a
holistic approach, the multiplicity of ways in which educational institutions can
promote or impede the capacity to flourish, the importance of attending to how
those capacities are distributed, and the special game-changing potential of cul-
tivating participatory readiness as civic agency. But, insofar as it is her aim to ar-
gue those claims, I suspect she could do so more straightforwardly, perhaps by
locating them within something like the following schema:
i) identify the full range of things we want education to do for the edu-
cated and those who stand to benefit, or suffer, from their education
(maybe a concern for the distinctive goods of childhood—seriously un-
dervalued by current policy regimes—might be added to her list);
ii) add in any concerns about how those goods should be distributed (ac-
knowledging here possible long-term causal processes with distribu-
tive implications, such as the impact of greater political equality on
economic inequality, and noting the positional aspect to political in-
fluence which she seems to underplay); and
iii) assess which institutions (e.g., public or private, family or school) and
which policies (e.g., funding formulas, accountability regimes) may le-
gitimately and effectively promote those various goods and their proper
distribution in current circumstances.
Of course, I am here reframing Allen’s concerns in an alternative mode that she
may well find uncongenial—and perhaps even colonizing. Certainly, debate
about answers to (i), (ii), and (iii) would be far from simple, and there would
be plenty to disagree about (including how educational curricula and teaching
methods should respond to—and equip us to deal with—those disagreements
themselves). Doubtless I am neglecting other strands in her argument that will
be valuable for those with different agendas. Still, for me, what Allen has given
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us is a wonderfully rousing and thought-provoking contribution to a debate best
conceived in these terms.
Adam Swift
University of Warwick
Chandhoke, Neera. Democracy and Revolutionary Politics.
London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. Pp. 192. $114.00 (cloth); $29.95 (paper).
We are used to thinking ofmajor revolutions, such as the FrenchorAmerican ones,
as being justified because they established a democratic order. In contrast, Neera
Chandhoke’s Democracy and Revolutionary Politics asks us to consider whether po-
litical violence can be justified within a democracy. Her answer to this important
question amounts to a tentative yes, namely, whenever a democratic order severely
fails to guarantee just outcomes in terms of substantive equality (12, 114). Being
indebted to Nancy Fraser’s tripartite theory of justice, Chandhoke argues that for
those who suffer, to an extreme extent, from a lack of social status (recognition),
material resources (redistribution), and especially voice (representation), violence
can provide a last resort for regaining agency. Violence is thus prima facie justi-
fied as it allows the oppressed “to speak back to histories not of their making” (2,
58, 60, 118, 121). This analysis comes with a note of caution, though. According
to Chandhoke, such violence has to occur within the context of a progressive
movement. Thus, acts of violence have to be guided by a political vision that mo-
bilizes the population.Otherwise, amere “theatre of violence” performedby guer-
rillas, paramilitaries, and state forces will degrade the oppressed to the role of pas-
sive spectators (157–58).
The mistaken prioritization of violence over politics is, according to Chand-
hoke, also the major problem of the Maoist struggle in India, which has in recent
decades tried to overthrow parliamentary democracy in order to establish a dif-
ferent form of (a people’s) democracy, mainly inspired by the communist revo-
lution in China (75, 86). A feature that separates Chandhoke’s study from others
is that it uses this conflict throughout as an empirical reference point for her
conceptual and normative considerations. Echoing Hannah Arendt’s distinction
between power and violence, Chandhokemaintains that the Maoists erroneously
emphasize the alleged power that “flows from the barrel of a gun” (75). Instead
they should focus on convincing people to join the project of overcoming the
unjust order—and on the role violence can play for such mobilization. Drawing
on the history of anticolonial struggles, Chandhoke detects “imaginative tech-
niques of mobilization” (132) in the historical guerrilla organizations of Guinea
Bissau and Cape Verde which targeted the lumpenproletariat and, after having
achieved territorial control, “established alternative political, administrative and
economic structures in the liberated regions” (133), thus creating “the nucleus
of a future state” (137). Unfortunately, the exact relationship between violence,
the regaining of agency, the political mobilization of the population, and the ac-
tual improvement of the fate of the oppressed remains rather vague throughout
the book. Although Chandhoke wants to combine political theory with empirical
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